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ADDRESS 



OF 



MAJ. GEN. A. A. HUMPHREYS 



ON 



M^ Mii<i'i'S?Y 0iJf{vid3]J^ 



OF THE LATE 



lb- |f"- ^^^W |oil^«n mA 



UNITED STATES ARMY, 



MADE AT 



The Meade Memorial Meeting 



OF 



The Citizens of Philadelphia, 



WASHINGTON, D. C. 
1872. 



ADDRESS 
MAJ. GEN. AV a. HUMPHREYS 



ON 



OF THE LATE 

jri- fr"- W^^'^^ i"':'^"" W^h 

UlSriTED STATES ARMY, 



MADE AT 



The Meade Memorial Meeting 

OF 

The Citizens of Philadelphia, 

Xoven^lDef 1§, l§t3. 



WASHINGTON, D. C. 
1872. 



0. 



// should be said in explanation of the impe7-fefl char a Her 
of this Address, that the titne allowed for its preparation was 
very brief, and equally so for its delivery, each speaker being 
necessarily limited to about thirty tninutes. 



Sf)f)l{sJ^^, 



Fellow-citizens of Philadelphia : 

As the friend and associate of the soldier whose loss the army 
and the nation deplore, I have been asked to address you con- 
cerning his military services. 

It is fitting that this duty should be devolved on me, for un- 
doubtedly I was more intimately associated with him during the 
time he commanded the Fifth Corps and the Army of the Potomac 
than any other officer. Besides, I have known him ever since 
his entrance into the service, then an intelligent, a polished, and 
witty young officer, on duty with the troops in Florida. 

My second recollection of him is as an engineer engaged 
under Captain Talcott, of the Corps of Engineers, upon an 
elaborate survey and investigation at the mouths of the Missis- 
sippi River, in which the facts elicited by some original experi- 
ments of his led me, many years after, to a series of investiga- 
tions- whch developed the law governing the formation of the 
bars and shoals at the mouth of that river, from which most im- 
portant consequences have followed for the improvement of 
navigation and the increase of commerce. 

We next find Meade engaged in the survey of the northeast 
boundary line between the United States and Great Britian ; 
then, in river and harbor improvements ; and in the Mexican 
war we see him as an officer of Engineers on the staff of Gene- 
ral Taylor and of General Scott, distinguished for skill and intre- 
pidity ; subsequently he was occupied with light-house construc- 
tion, and during the four years preceding the civil war had charge 



6 

of the geodetic survey of the great lakes, in his conduct of which 
he added largely to his scientific and engineering reputation. 

I have referred to these varied occupations because they gave 
the training which fitted him for the great part he was soon to 
fill. In them he learned to plan carefully in advance, and to 
execute promptly and thoroughly ; here he acquired the habit of 
qdick and accurate observation, and became fertile in expedients 
to meet unlooked-for exigencies. 

Early in the civil war we find him a Brigadier General of Vol- 
unteers, commanding a brigade in the Pennsylvania Reserve 
Corps, which constituted a division in the Army of the Potomac, 
and taking an active part in the battles of Gaines' Mill and 
Glendale, in the last days of June, 1862, being severely wounded 
in the latter. Returning to the field as soon as the condition of 
his wound would permit, he was assigned to the command of a 
division, and distinguished himself in the battles of South Moun- 
tain and Antietam, being placed in command of Hooker's Corps 
when that officer was wounded and taken from the field. For 
these services he was promoted to the rank of Major General of 
Volunteers in November of 1862. 

As a Division Commander he was impetuous in attack ; and at 
Fredericksburg broke through the right of Lee's line, and pene- 
trated far to its rear, but was overborne by numbers, and forced 
back with heavy loss. Quickly following this conspicuous ser- 
vice, he was, in the latter part of December, 1862, promoted to 
the command of the Fifth Army Corps, and at Chancellorville 
his sagacious advice and soldierly bearing made so profound an 
impression upon the commander of the Army of the Potomac, 
that, in asking some two months later to be relieved from its 
charge, he designated General Meade as his successor. 

On the morning of the 28th of June, 1863, when in the vicinity 



of Frederick, Md., with the Fifth Corps, General Meade was 
placed by the President in command of the Army of the Poto- 
mac, which at that time was not far from Frederick, following 
carefully the movements of Lee. 

Lee was on that day at Chambersburg, about 50 miles north, 
a little west of Frederick, with two of his three corps. Long- 
street's and Hill's. Ewell with two of his divisions, was at Car- 
lisle, about 30 miles north of Chambersburg, his third division, 
under Early, being at York. 

Let us see what Lee says as to the object of his presence at 
these points, more than 200 miles away from Fredericksburg, 
Va. In his official report of his operations, written a month 
after the battle of Gettysburg, he states that the Army of the 
Potomac occupied such a position opposite Fredericksburg that 
it could not be attacked with advantage, and that by his moving 
northward through the great Valley of Virginia the correspond- 
ing movements of the Army of the Potomac would probably 
offer a fair opportunity to strike a successful blow at that army ; 
that such a movement would disarrange our plan of campaign 
for the summer and consume our time, and that in addition to 
these advantages it was hoped that other valuable results )iiigJit 
be attained by military success. Actuated, he says, by these and 
other important considerations that may hereafter be presented, 
the movement began. 

These other important cojtsiderations hsiwe never yet been pre- 
sented. The campaign having failed, it is not to be expected 
that its great object will ever be any more distinctly acknowl- 
edged. Let us see further what he says in this report. The 
absence of his cavalry, which was making a raid around the 
Army of the Potomac, doing no harm to it, rendered it impossi- 
ble for him (he says) to obtain accurate information of the 



movements of our army, and he did not know whether it had 
crossed the Potomac. Preparations, he states, were now made 
(on the 28th and 29th June) to advance upon Harrisburg. This 
sentence, I think, reveals the great object of his campaign. It 
was the capture of this city, Philadelphia. 

There were at least two fatal errors in the premises on which 
this plan was formed : one of these was the conviction the Army 
of Northern Virginia derived from Chancellorville — that it could 
beat the Army of the Potomac, wherever it found it ; the second 
was, that the handling of the Army of the Potomac at Chancel- 
lorville would be repeated in Pennsylvania. In both these con- 
victions they found themselves fatally deceived. The Army of 
the Potomac did not fight at Chancellorville. The Eleventh 
Corps,, badly posted, was permitted to be surprised by over- 
whelming numbers, and routed. The Third Corps, aided by 
artillery posted by Pleasanton, threw itself into the breach, 
arrested the forward movement of the enemy, and the next 
morning was allowed to sustain the attack of Lee's whole force 
for several hours, losing in killed and wounded a large part of 
its numbers. It was of course obliged to fall back upon the 
other portion of the army, the First, Second, Fifth, and Twelfth 
Corps, in position near by, just in rear of Chancellorville. 
Only parts of some of these Corps were partially engaged in 
covering the withdrawal of the Third Corps. 

Sedgwick, advancing from Fredericksburg, with the Sixth 
Corps and one division of the Second Corps, was then attacked 
by Lee, and forced back over the Rappahannock. Lee, in this 
operation, had 60,000 men, Longstreet's Corps being absent; 
Hooker not less than 90,000 men. It is not surprising, then, that 
the Army of Northern Virginia should have made a false estimate 
of its prowess, or at least of that of the Army of the Potomac. 



■ On the night of the 29th June, Lee learned that the Army of 
the Potomac had crossed the Potomac, and had advanced as far as 
Frederick ; he also learned that its command had changed hands. 
His order for movement on Harrisburg was at once changed, and; 
Longstreet, Hill and Ewell were ordered to concentrate at Gettys-: 
burg, a small town 25 miles from Chambersburg, and some 10 
miles east of the Blue Ridge, from which roads radiated in all 
directions. 

Meade states that he passed the 28th June in ascertaining the 
strength and position of the different Corps of the army, and in 
bringing up the cavalry from the rear. He also carefully- 
inquired into the strength and position of the enemy, so far as 
known. He further states that his predecessor left camp in a 
few hours after he was relieved, and that he did not receive from 
him any intimation of a plan of operations, or any views upon 
the situation ; that he was not aware that General Hooker had any, 
but was waiting further exigencies of the occasion to govern him, 
just as he (Meade) did subsequently. On the morning of the' 
29th Meade put his army in motion for Harrisburg, expecting to" 
compel the enemy to turn and meet him in battle. We have 
seen that Lee, on the evening of that day, prepared to do so. 
On the evening of the 30th the several Corps of the Army of 
the Potomac were on the roads leading to Gettysburg, from the 
east round to the south, and at distances from the town varying 
from ten to fifteen miles, excepting the Sixth Corps, which was 
more than thirty miles off. Buford, with his division of cavalry, 
was in Gettysburg. On that same night Meade learned from 
Buford that the heads of Lee's columns were moving on the 
roads leading to Gettysburg, and were probably nearer than his 
to Gettysburg. 

• Being entirely ignorant of the character of the ground about' 



lO 

Gettysburg, he at once prepared a precautionary order of in- 
structions to the Corps Commanders, not to be executed unless 
specially ordered at a subsequent time in a certain contingency, 
explaining the routes which the several Corps should follow to 
concentrate in a good position on Pipe Clay Creek, some three 
miles in rear of his headquarters at Taneytown. (Taneytown, 
it may be remarked, is about 13 miles south of Gettysburg.) 

These instructions stated, " developments may cause the Com- 
manding General to assume the offensive from his present posi- 
tions." Not many hours after the issuing of these instructions, 
new developments did cause him to change his plans, but these 
instructions evince that foresight which proves his capacity to 
command an army. In similar circumstances, the agreement 
between Wellington and Bliicher to concentrate their two 
armies — nearly double the numbers of Napoleon — far to the 
rear in the vicinity of Waterloo, has been esteemed a proof of 
their great ability. On the evening of the 30th, Reynolds, with 
the First and Eleventh Corps, was ordered to move on the morn- 
ing of the 1st of July from Emmettsburg to Gettysburg, and to 
report whether that site afforded a good field of battle. The 
Third Corps was to be in Emmettsburg on the morning of the 
1st, and in fact reached there before all the Eleventh Corps had 
left it. About noon of the 30th, I was requested by General 
Meade to examine the ground in the vicinity of Emmettsburg 
upon the arrival there of the Third Corps, the second division 
of which I commanded, and ascertain whether it afforded a 
a good position for battle. The importance of the general posi- 
tion of Emmettsburg is derived from the fact that a piked road 
leads to it through the mountains from the Chambersburg valley, 
(along which part of Lee's force might move), and that good 
branch roads lead to it along the foot of the mountains from the 



Cashtown pass. I have mentioned these two facts concerning 
Reynolds and myself to show that Meade was active in learning 
all that could be ascertained of the several positions where he 
might fight to advantage, as well as in moving towards Lee, and 
bringing the different parts of the Army of the Potomac within 
supporting distance of each other. That army consisted of about 
70,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 300 guns. The Army of 
Northern Virginia consi:sted of about 85,000 infantry, 8,000 
cavalry, and a due proportion of artillery. 

We all know how, on the morning of the ist of July, Rey- 
nolds encountered Hill two or three miles west of Gettysburg, 
and was killed early in the day ; how Ewell arrived on the 
ground soon after ; and how the First and Eleventh Corps were 
forced back to the position on which the fighting of the 2d and 
3d of July took place. We know, too, that as soon as Meade 
learned what had occurred, the Third, Twelfth and other Corps 
were hurried up to the scene. Hancock, who was with Meade at 
Taneytown at the time, was dispatched to take command of the 
advance, and he reported at about half-past five that the position 
was sufficiently good, when Meade set the remainder of the 
army in motion for the field, and arrived upon the ground at 
midnight. All the army was concentrated there by one o'clock 
next day. 

One of Meade's first directions to his Chief-of-Staff, Butterfield, 
upon reaching there, was to learn everything about the roads 
leading to and from Gettysburg, so as to be prepared for any 
event that might occur— a very proper direction to give. All the 
Army of Northern Virginia was concentrated at Gettysburg 
during the night, except Pickett's division of Longstreet's Corps, 
which did not arrive until the morning of the 3d. 

Lee explains at some length why he attacked next day. 



12 

Clearly, his true policy was to abstain from attack ; to move in 
concentrated formation as rapidly as practicable toward the ob- 
jective of his campaign ; to trench every position he occupied. 
The country, every step of the way to Philadelphia, is full of 
strong positions. The exigencies of the case would have forced 
the Army of the Potomac to attack him. With nearly equal 
numbers, with rifled arms, and the trenches that may be thrown 
up in half-an-hour, or even less, the chances are all against the 
attacking force. But here, at Gettysburg, we had no trenches, 
except for a short distance on the right, on Gulp's hill and vicin- 
ity. In reality, the governing cause of Lee's attack was the suc- 
cess of the Army of Northern Virginia at Chancellorville. 

The disposition Meade made of his troops was the best the 
ground and circumstances permitted. The features of the bat- 
tle-field are so well known that 1 shall not stop to describe them. 

You all know how the battle on the second day went on, and 
that the hardest fighting of the three days of battle took place 
on it. Lee attacked our left with Longstreet's Gorps and part of 
Hill's, under the cover of woods, which concealed their approach, 
and a long-continued, desperate struggle ensued, lasting from 
half-past four until seven o'clock, in which we lost the advanced 
part of the ground we had taken up ; but the main position re- 
mained intact. 

On the third day Lee resumed the attack with Pickett's divis- 
ion of Longstreet's Gorps (which had arrived that morning) and 
Heth's division of Hill's Gorps, supported by two divisions which 
did not largely participate in the struggle. The advance of the 
leading divisions was made over clear, open ground, and was 
preceded by a heavy fire from 1 15 guns. 

The gallant manner in which this advance was made, under 
the powerful fire of our artillery and infantry extorted the admi- 



13 

ration of those against whom it was directed. But through the 
excellent dispositions of Meade, ably seconded by his comman- 
ders, and the skill and courage of our officers and men, all the 
attacking force that reached our lines became our prisoners, as 
\\ell as a considerable portion of the supporting divisions, and 
the third day terminated in a victory for us, and the demolition 
of all the Confederate plans. 

Of all the sublime sights within the view and comprehension of 
man, the grandest, the most sublime, is a great battle. Its sights 
and sounds arouse a feeling of exaltation, compared to which, 
tame indeed, is the sense of the sublime excited by all other great 
works, either of God or man. No grander sight was seen through- 
out the war than this great battle between two brave, well dis- 
ciplined and ably commanded armies. 

Immediately upon the repulse, Meade ordered an advance 
from the left, which went forward, but the day was too far spent 
for any important result to be gained. Longstreet and Hill 
ardently wished for a return attack upon their lines. 

Lee's losses were 18,000 killed and wounded and 13,600 miss- 
ing, a large part of the latter being our prisoners, making a total 
loss of 31,600. Our losses were 16,500 killed and wounded and 
6,600 missing, chiefly prisoners captured the first day, making a 
total loss of not less than 23,000. 

The Army of Northern Virginia never recovered from this 
blow, but its morale remained good. Sixty thousand strong, it 
began to retreat in good order on the night of the 4th. Our ex- 
perience has shown that one army can draw off from another in 
the night without its being discovered. Learning on the morn- 
ing of the 5th that it had withdrawn, Meade sent the Sixth Corps 
and the cavalry to follow it to the mountain passes, through which 
Sedgwick found it would not be practicable to pursue with any 



'4 

chance of success, owing to the facility with which they could be 
defended with a small force. Meade, therefore, moved in pur- 
suit by the Boonsborough pass, the first practicable route through 
the mountains south of those taken by Lee, and on the 12th of 
July canne up with him near Williamsport, on the Potomac River. 
Here Lee occupied a strong position, his right resting on the river 
at Falling Waters, and his left resting on it at Williamsport, thus 
enclosing his crossing-places. Tliis position, naturally strong, 
was well entrenched, with artillery judiciously posted. Careful 
reconnoissances failed to ascertain a suitable point of attack ; but 
notwithstanding, Meade ordered a reconnoissance in force, sup- 
ported by the whole army, at daylight on the morning of the 14th, 
On the night of the 13th, Lee recrossed the Potomac. 

There was a great deal of clamor because Meade had not 
pressed Lee more vigorously in pursuit, and had not captured 
his army at Williamsport. Let us see what means Meade had 
to accomplish all this. The return of the Army of the Potomac 
on the 5th of July showed present for duty, 54,000 infantry and 
artillery, and 7,000 cavalry — in all, 61,000 men — just about the 
same force that Lee had ; and Lee's army was not demoralized, 
nor was it more fatigued or suffering than the Army of the Poto- 
mac ; the only material reinforcement Meade received before 
coming up with Lee at Williainsport was a division of 6,000 men 
under French. Had he assaulted he would have been repulsed 
with heavy loss, and without inflicting any material injury on 
the enemy. 

Let ine compare a little the battle of Gettysburg and the move- 
ments immediately following it with a certain great battle in 
Europe, to which, in some respects, it bears a resemblance. This 
comparison will, I think, afford means of appreciating properly 
the real merits of Meade and his army better than anything else 



'5 

I can say. I refer to the battle of Waterloo ; a splendidly fought 
battle on both sides. Extending over a line only two or three 
miles long, it was all within view from many points ; the greater 
part of the fighting was comprised within the limited space of six 
or seven hundred yards square, and in that space at the close of 
the battle lay many thousands killed and wounded. 

Wellington had posted his army in a good position on the crest 
of a long slope of open ground. He had there 50,000 infantry, 
12,000 cavalry, and 6,000 artillery, (156 guns ;) in all, 68,000 men. 

Napoleon had drawn up his force ready for an attack on an 
opposite crest about a mile distant, the ravine between being 
equally distant from the two. His force consisted of 50,000 
infantry, 16,000 cavalry, and 7,000 artillery (246 guns;) in all, 
73,000 men. But of this force, he was obliged to keep over 
12,000 men posted on his extreme right, to meet the expected 
advance of the Prussian army, which began to come up from 
the direction of W^avre soon after 12 o'clock. At Wavre, about 
ten or twelve miles to the French right. Grouchy, with some 32,000 
men and 100 guns, was attacking one of the four Prussian corps 
left there to detain him. The remainder of the Prussian army 
under Bliicher, 52,000 strong, with 100 guns, was hastening as 
fast as the soft roads would permit, from an early hour in the 
morning, toward the French right, to carry out the plan agreed 
upon with Wellington. Napoleon, too, looked for Grouchy to 
arrive from the same direction. You will perceive that Napoleon 
was dealing with nearly double his own force. 

Napoleon's attacks on Wellington, five in number, began at 
half-past eleven o'clock, and continued at intervals until half- 
past seven in the evening. At half-past four the Prussians were 
up in force, and attacked the French right heavily and continu- 
ously, with increasing force, until the close of the battle. 



i6 

The last attack of Napoleon was made with great impetuosity 
upon the whole of Wellington's line, the two forces being not 
more than sixty yards apart. Failing of success, the French 
rapidly withdrew, and Wellington says, seeing that they withdrew 
in some confusion, he advanced his whole hne, but they moved no 
further than the positions that had been occupied by the French 
army, and from which its attacks had been made. There 
they halted for the night. The French right also drew off, fol- 
lowed in pursuit by the Prussians, who continued to press the 
French army all night. 

In this batde, the losses were, in Wellington's army, 10,000 
killed and wounded; in Bliicher's, 6,000 killed and wounded ; 
the French losses have been stated at 18,500 killed and wounded, 
and 7,000 prisoners. 

The French wounded and a large portion of their artillery, 
the horses being killed, were left upon the field. The Prussians 
captured an immense booty, the trains, camp equipage, and 
nearly all the remaining artillery which was abandoned on the 
route. 

Recollect that this battle was fought, and all the operations 
preceding and following it were conducted, in a perfectly open, 
gently undulating country ; that the French were obliged to 
recross the river Sambre on their frontier, some twenty-five miles 
from Waterloo, yet the prisoners captured by the Prussians in 
this pursuit amounted to only 6,000 ; the whole number of French 
prisoners taken being stated at 7,000. Further, Grouchy did 
not hear of the battle until the next day, when Bliicher and Wel- 
lington were between him and the river Sambre, the French 
frontier, yet he retreated into France without any loss. 

T think this, taken with what has been previously said, is suffi- 



7 

cient to dispose of the question why Meade did not capture 
Lee's army. 

After a careful examination of the subject, so far as I am 
capable of forming an opinion, I am led to the conclusion that 
Meade, at Gettysburg, had a more difficult task than Wellington 
at Waterloo, and performed it equally well, although he had no 
Bliicher to turn the scale in his favor. 

A word or two more. Wellington, for his services in Portugal 
and Spain, had been raised through every grade of the British 
peerage to its highest rank, and Parliament had voted him large 
sums of money to enable him to live in a manner corresponding 
to his position. For Waterloo, there was no additional rank in 
the peerage to give him, but Parliament voted _^20o,ooo, about 
a million of dollars. The whole sum thus bestowed amounted 
to nearly four millions of dollars. What remaining honors or 
marks of esteem there were left in the hands of the sovereigns 
of Europe to distribute, he was decorated with. 

Meade, who was a Major in the Corps of Engineers, was pro- 
moted to the rank of Brigadier General in the Regular Army, 
and was gratified at this mark of approval. 

He had to bear many unjust criticisms on his conduct of the 
battle, and condemnation for not capturing the whole of Lee's 
army. But time effaces all such attempted blemishes as these, 
and I believe Meade always felt satisfied that history would do 
him justice. 

After crossing the Potomac, Lee was disposed to remain near 
Winchester, among the fertile products of the valley of Virginia ; 
but a well-directed thrust by Meade, through Manassas Gap, sent 
Lee rapidly out of the Valley and across the Rappahannock. 

On this river the Army of the Potomac was ordered from 



i8 



Washington to rest, and several detachments were made from 
it to the City of New York, to North Carohna, and elsewhere. 

In September, Meade having ascertained that Longstreet's 
Corps had been sent to Bragg, on the Tennessee River, (except- 
ing Pickett's division, which was recruiting South of the James,) 
moved forward, and Lee fell back behind the Rapidan — a more 
defensible river than the Upper Rappahannock. At this time the 
Eleventh and Twelfth Ccrps were detached from the Army of the 
Potomac and sent to Chattanooga, and the two opposing armies 
on the Rapidan were reduced to about equal numbers. 

Early in October, Meade was contemplating a movement upon 
Lee by our right flank, and on the morning of the 9th rode to 
Cedar Mountain to have a better look at the country in the direc- 
tion of a certain mountain pass, when he discovered that Lee was 
making some movement on our right ; and at the same moment 
intelligence from the pickets and signal stations began to pour 
in, but the nature of the movement could not be ascertained with 
certainty until Lee had concentrated his whole army in the rear 
and right of Meade, threatening to intercept and break up his 
lines of communication. 

The Army of the Potomac was at once set in motion, and di- 
rected toward Warrenton, with the intention of attacking Lee 
while in the act of crossing the Rappahannock, with every chance 
of a successful issue. But when the movement was half through 
one of Mead's commanders brought him wrong information of 
the movements, position, and apparent object of Lee ; while from 
another commander, who should have furnished the most im- 
portant information of all, he received none whatever. In this 
manner he was misled, a part of his army was placed in a critical 
condition, and the opportunity of attacking Lee was lost. There 
followed a series of manoeuvres by the two armies, during which 



"9 

the brilliant combats of Bristoe Station and Rappahannock 
Bridge took place, the movement ending in Lee's recrossing the 
Rapidan. After the war, Lee acknowledged to Meade that his 
scheme had been frustrated in this operation ; that he had been 
completely outmanoeuvred. 

Among the criticisms made on these operations, it was said : 
Lee uncovered Richmond by his movement— why did not Meade 
move on that and swap queens ? The answer to it was very 
obvious. The two queens were not of equal value. Richmond 
was a small town, and any other much smaller town would have 
furnished equally well all the conveniences required for the per- 
sonnel of the Confederate government. There were no southern 
towns of any consequence within several hundred miles of it. 
Washington was four times larger than Richmond, was the 
capital of the country, and had collected in it all our national 
archives. Near to it was the rich and populous city of Baltimore, 
and not far off the still richer and more populous city of Phila- 
delphia. 

The task of the Army of the Potomac was to cover all these 
cities, and carry on offensive operations against the Army of 
Northern Virginia in a country intersected with wide, deep, rapid 
rivers, and covered in great part with dense forests and thickets. 
To do all this required a large numerical superiority on the part 
of the Army of the Potomac. But it did not possess any material 
superiority of numbers during the time Meade commanded it 
until the spring of 1864. 

Having ascertained that Ewell's half of Lee's force was so 
posted that it could be surprised by a well-directed rapid move- 
ment across the Rapidan by the Army of the Potomac, Meade 
in the latter part of November secretely crossed the Rapidan 
close to Lee's right, and advanced with the Second Corps, only 



20 

8,ooo strong, to the point of concentration close upon Ewell, at 
the hour named, 12 o'clock of the second day, and engaged the 
enemy. The left wing reached its designated position in time, 
but the right wing, consisting of about half the army, which 
should have united with the Second Corps at twelve o'clock, be- 
came entangled in the Wilderness forest, and did not move more 
than three miles from the river, nor reach the point of concen- 
tration until the next morning. The opportunity for surprise was 
lost, and Lee had time to concentrate his army and take up a 
strong position on Mine Run, and entrench it by the time Meade 
reached there. The only points of attack offering any chance 
of success were on Lee's right and left flank ; he occupied the 
inner and much shorter line of an arc, we the outer and longer 
line. Dispositions were made to attack from our right and left, 
the interval of four or five miles between the two nearly equal 
parts of the army being thinly held with one or two divisions of 
infantry and artillery ; the most vicious disposition for battle pos- 
sible, but the only one left Meade. Just as the artillery fire was 
about to cease, and the infantry on the right were about to run 
forward to the assault, an aide from the commander on the left 
dashed up and informed General Meade it was impossible to 
attack them. To ha^e attacked under such a condition Avould 
have resulted in disaster, for Lee, having nothing to contend with 
on our left, and much shorter distance to move over than we, 
could have concentrated on our point of attack and repulsed it, 
and advancing on the open space between our two wings, which 
there was not time to close, could have divided our army in two. 
Instantly the order was given to suspend the attack, and Meade 
rode to the left, to see by personal inspection what the chance 
was there. He found it to be as represented, and the troops from 
the centre were returned to their former positions. By this time 



the enemy had also discovered our plan of attack from the right, 
and were prepared for it ; the scheme had to be abandoned. 

It was, however, persistently urged on General Meade to at- 
tack, because the public would be dissatisfied if he did not, and 
would not believe that he ought not to have attacked, unless he 
did attack and was bloodily repulsed. Meade knew at the time 
that if he did not attack there would be a clamor against him 
that would probably lead to his removal from command, but 
notwithstanding, he gave no ear to the counsel I have mentioned, 
preferring to be governed by his own judgment rather than by 
public opinion. 

As the winter had commenced, and as Meade believed that 
the line of operations from Fredericksburg would not be viewed 
with satisfaction at Washington, he withdrew to his former posi- 
tion on the north side of the Rapidan. 

During the winter certain military events took place, which, 
though of interest, have no important bearing on the present 
subject. 

Before the season for active operations returned, General 
Grant had been appointed Lieutenant General, and placed in 
command of all the armies. He concluded to make his head- 
quarters with the Army of the Potomac, Burnside's Corps, and 
the Army of the James. 

During the winter and spring, the Army of the Potomac had 
been reinforced, and when the campaign opened consisted of 
76,000 infantry, in three corps, commanded by Sedgwick, Han- 
cock, and Warren, and about 12,000 cavalry, commanded by 
Sheridan, with a large artillery force, having its own guard, 
which, when the artillery was reduced, (about the middle of 
May,) was joined to one of the infantry corps. Burnside had 
some 15,000 or 20,000 men, which united with the Army of the 



22 

Potomac early on the morning of the 6th of May, the second 
day of the battle of the Wilderness. 

Lee's force consisted of three corps, each about 20,000 strong, 
commanded by Ewell, Hill, and Longstreet, who arrived the 3d 
of May, and 8,000 or 10,000 cavalry, commanded by Steuart, 
with a due proportion of artillery. 

The artillery of both armies was more than could be used in 
that country, and with us was cumbersome, and therefore reduced 
when we were near Fredericksburg. 

The object of the campaign was to fight Lee's army and break 
it to pieces. Failing in that, upon our forcing it back upon Rich- 
mond, we were to destroy all lines of supply to that city upon the 
north bank of the James River ; then cross over, and, encircling 
the town, destroy all lines of supply on the south side. 

The question first settled was, shall the movement be by the 
right flank, passing through Madison Court-House and crossing 
the Rapidan at or above Lee's left flank. 

This was decided against, as beyond the Rapidan, (as far as 
could be learned) the roads did not admit of the ready move- 
ment of the different corps for concentration, and if by Lee's 
movements he should avoid heavy fighting, he could, while 
maintaining his communication with his supplies at Richmond, 
harass the new lines of communication and supply that must be 
opened for the Army of the Potomac toward the Potomac River 
and Chesapeake Bay, as we advanced. The importance of this 
objection was shown by the necessity of sending so many thous- 
ands wounded from the Army of the Potomac by Fredericks- 
burg, in two or three days after we began to move. 

The objection to moving by the left flank was that it took us 
through the tangled mass of woods called the Wilderness, where 
Lee, by prompt movement, could force us to stop and fight him. 



23 

I 

and where from the denseness of the woods and undergrowth, 
the troops acting on the defensive were unseen, while those mov- 
ing to the attack could be plainly perceived. It served almost 
as effectually as an intrenchment for the army acting on the de- 
fensive. 

The advantage in moving by the left flank consisted in keep- 
ing close to the Potomac River, and all lines of communication 
and supply we should want to open from time to time, and which 
our army would effectually cover. Accordingly it was decided 
to move by the left. 

The project was to get through the Wilderness quickly, and 
endeavor to cut Lee's line of communication, (the Central Rail- 
road,) somewhere between Louisa Court-House and Gordons- 
ville, and attack him in the comparatively open country. 

The moment our movement was perceived, Lee concentrated. 
Ewell being nearest to us, was thrust along the pike against us. 
Hill along the Orange Court-House plank-road ; Longstreet was 
to come up on our left flank. By simply thrusting himself against 
us, we were obliged to stop our movement to attack Lee ; we 
could not go on ; if we did, he would watch his opportunity and 
overwhelm some portion that was exposed. 

Meade knew that Lee's best course was to move against us 
and force us to attack him in the Wilderness, as I have already 
stated ; therefore, when, early in the morning of the second day 
of movement, advance parties of the enemy attacked our cav- 
alry on the Orange Court-House plank-road and the advance 
guard thrown out on the pike, Meade apprehended that the first 
battle would be fought in the Wilderness. But there was no 
means of telling at first whether these small attacks were made 
simply by very advanced parties of the enemy, made for the 
purpose of interrupting and delaying our march, or were made 



24 

by the advance guards of Lee's main army. There was but one 
thing to do — to attack at once, clear them out of the way if we 
could, take prisoners, and find out where the main force of the 
Army was. Hancock who moved promptly in the morning from 
Chancellorville on the route directed in the general order of the 
3d May, was directed to halt at Todd's tavern until it could be 
ascertained what the enemy's intentions were. They were soon 
disclosed. Ewell and Hill were close on us, and were at once 
attacked by the Fifth Corps. Hancock was brought back from 
the vicinity of Todd's tavern to the intersection of the Orange 
plank-road with the Brock road. Until he could get up, Getty's 
division of the Sixth Corps was sent to that intersection, and was 
at once engaged with Ewell. The Sixth Corps was posted on 
our right. 

Thus commenced that extraordinary series of battles of two 
months' duration, at the termination of which the Army of the 
Potomac had lost more than 60,000 men in killed and wounded. 

The position of General Meade all this time was a delicate 
one, owing to the near presence of an officer of superior rank 
and command. He acquitted himself in it in such a manner as 
to command the respect and esteem of General Grant, between 
whom and himself there was, I believe, complete accord. For 
his eminent services in the campaign Meade was made a Major 
General in the' Regular Army. 

The close of June saw the commencement of what is termed 
the siege of Richmond and Petersburg, which lasted until the 
1st of April, 1865. During this long period, many operations, 
battles, and combats took place, with varying success. Through- 
out them all, the marked ability of Meade as a commander was 
conspicuous. 

The breaking of the lines of Petersburg on the ist of April was 



25 

succeeded by the flying, fighting retreat, and surrender of the 
Army of Northern Virginia, and with that surrender came peace. 
Perhaps the very imperfect reference to General Meades mih- 
tary hfe which I have just made may serve to show what a great 
experience he had, and how valuable to his country his life has 
been, and that his death in full bodily and mental vigor is a great 
national loss. 



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